A considerable portion of the law is made in the lower federal courts, with the Supreme Court serving primarily as the overseer of those lower courts' decisions. Nevertheless, there remain significant gaps in our knowledge about the incentives and constraints facing lower court judges responsible for law creation. We develop and test a principal-agent model of law creation in a judicial hierarchy. The model yields new insights about the relationship among various features of the judicial hierarchy that run against many existing perceptions. We derive several previously unrecognized interactions among the types of cases brought to the courts, the preferences of the judges, and how lower courts will decide cases, declare rules, and be reviewed. Our theoretical model reveals a series of predictions discriminating among previous theories, and the empirical evidence supports those hypotheses.
Introduction
Judge-made law constitutes a large portion of the rules that affect the daily lives of most people in the United States. Courts make law on such important constitutional matters as whether public education may be segregated along racial lines, as well as more routine matters such as the conditions that constitute wrongful termination. Given its position at the apex of the judicial hierarchy, in studying judge-made law scholars often focus on the Supreme Court. However, that focus misses how a substantial amount of judge-made law is created in the United States. The Supreme Court hears only a very small fraction of the cases filed in federal courts (only about 0.02%); most law is both made and applied at the level of the lower courts, especially the federal courts of appeals. Indeed, when making law, the Supreme Court is often guided by much law that has previously been created by lower courts. 1
Perhaps surprisingly, relatively little attention has been paid to understanding lower court rulemaking. To the degree that lower courts are incorporated into theories of judicial law-making, they are usually treated as subordinate institutions responsible only for implementing rules generated by the Supreme Court. Scholars examine issues such as whether and to what degree lower courts deviate from applying the rules generated by the Supreme Court, and, given these tendencies, under what conditions the Supreme Court reviews and reverses lower court decisions (e.g., Cameron, Segal and Songer 2000) (hereinafter, "CSS").
In this paper we develop and test a novel theory of rule creation in which the lower court is explicitly allowed to formulate its own rules, subject to possible review by an upper court.
Introducing the ability of lower courts to declare rules as well as decide cases allows us to answer three previously unexplored questions about law creation in a judicial hierarchy. First, how do characteristics of the instant case (i.e. the actual facts of the case, the importance of the instant case, and the degree to which the lower and upper court have differing preferences over what rules should govern that body of law) affect the kinds of rules the lower court will declare? Second, under what conditions is the upper court more likely to review the decision of the lower court in light of the rule the lower court declares? And third, how is the upper court likely to treat the lower courts decision, both in terms of the way a lower court decides a case and the rule used to justify that decision?
We find a number of surprising, and normatively important, relationships in answer to these questions. For example, the actual facts of the case can significantly influence the rule the lower court declares. Thus, the merits of the case under consideration can potentially substantially influence the future direction and content of judge-made law. Further, at times the upper court intentionally allows the lower court to establish rules that are relatively distant from the upper court's preferred law while potentially reviewing and reversing decisions that appear, at least on the surface, far more consonant with their preferences. This finding has important implications for the extent to which SC preferences over law determines how U.S. law is actually applied. Finally, we find nonlinear relationships between the ideological divergence of the lower court from the upper court and the likelihood of both review and reversal by the upper court. Not only is this a novel finding, but, again, it has substantial implications for Supreme Court influence on the application of law. We test this last pair of findings and find evidence consistent with the model's predictions.
In sum, these findings suggest we cannot understand how U.S. law is created and applied without understanding the role of lower courts in judicial law creation.
Previous Approaches
In the study of decision-making in the judicial hierarchy, past research has focused most directly on how or to what extent judges higher in the hierarchy-e.g., the Supreme Court-can control or influence the decisions made by judges lower in the hierarchy. Rather than examining the rule-making function served by lower courts, this research has focused on error correction in the hierarchy. Theoretical and empirical research has demonstrated that when lower judges disregard their superiors' preferences, they will be more likely to be reviewed (e.g., Cameron, Segal and Songer 2000; Clark 2009 ). The operative assumption underlying this research, and one that we adopt, is that higher courts seek to strategically audit lower courts in an effort to "catch" those cases that are the most displeasing to the higher court.
To the extent research has directly considered lower court behavior, the focus has been almost exclusively on the votes lower court judges cast, not on the role they play in the construction of law (e.g., Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek 2006) . The most notable exception to this pattern is Klein (2002) , who empirically examines the creation of legal rules by circuit courts in the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court. Klein considers cases where the Supreme Court has not offered an authoritative legal rule to govern a situation-i.e., cases of first impression. While he does not develop an explicit theory of inter-court interactions, Klein argues the extent to which a judge adopts an existing rule depends critically on whether the judge is ideologically aligned with that rule. 2 Importantly, though, Klein argues that judges on the court of appeals are not influenced by the anticipated preferences of the Supreme Court when deciding a case of first impression.
Some studies, however, have considered the effects of inter-court interactions on rule-creation.
That research, though, has been primarily theoretic and from a "top-down" perspective. The adoption of the "case space" model (Kornhauser 1992) has given rise to considerable research on the nature of legal rules and the method of law creation in courts. Perhaps most notably, Lax (2007) offers a comprehensive theory of legal rule construction in a multidimensional case space by a collegial court. Lax's theory, however, is limited in that while it considers some hierarchical implications of rule created by the Supreme Court, it does not focus on the effect of the hierarchy on the creation of rules. In related papers, Staton and Vanberg (2008) and Lax (2009) more explicitly contemplate issues of compliance by subordinate and parallel decision-makers. Both of these studies conclude that a court may be willing to allow leeway for shirking by lower courts or politicians. What these studies do not provide, however, is much traction on the ways in which judicial institutions and the cases heard by lower courts shape the law created by lower courts or the influence the Supreme Court has over that law.
As noted above, we take a different tack to address those questions. We approach the problem of rule creation in a hierarchy from the bottom up. Taking note of the facts that (a) most law is created in the courts of appeals, and (b) cases proceed from the bottom of the hierarchy to the top, we focus on the strategic choices facing a lower court when making law. In the next section, we advance a series of formal models of law creation in a judicial hierarchy characterized by an informational asymmetry (i.e., lower courts are better informed about cases than are higher courts who have not yet reviewed them). We then discuss the implications of our model and present empirical support for two of the key predictions.
The Models
The models we advance build off of the canonical principal-agent models in the existing literature.
In particular, consistent with CSS we assume a lower court hears a case with some specific case facts and must determine the outcome of the case. The upper court observes the lower court's decision, but does not observe the actual case facts unless it chooses to review the lower court's decision. Reviewing a lower court decision requires paying some time and/or resource cost, but in exchange it allows the upper court to learn the case facts and dictate its preferred outcome.
Critically unlike CSS, we allow the lower court to declare a rule as well as dispose of the case at hand. This rule is observable to the upper court before the decision to grant cert, and therefore it potentially provides information that the upper court can cue off of in deciding whether to hear an appeal. As with the lower court's disposition, the upper court can revise the lower court's rule as it wishes upon granting cert. A final key feature of our model is that whereas most models of judicial hierarchies assume there exists some exogenous cost to being reviewed-a cost associated with the displeasure of being reviewed-we do not assume such a cost. Rather, any diminution of the lower court's utility from review arises endogenously in the model.
Our baseline model is of a myopic lower court-a nonstrategic lower court not influenced by the institutional structure of the hierarchy. This is very much a court in the spirit of Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek (2006) and Klein (2002) . This model serves as a benchmark against which we can compare behavior in subsequent extensions. We then introduce a strategic element to the model-we allow the lower court to have preferences over the decisions made by its superior court. This is a court similar to those contemplated by most models of judicial auditing (e.g., Cameron, Segal and Songer 2000; Clark 2009 ). Finally, we further extend our model by introducing an additional informational asymmetry. Specifically, we assume that the lower court is uncertain about the higher court's costliness of reviewing its decision. One can interpret this uncertainty as simply about the cost of reviewing a case or about how much the upper court cares to devote its resources to the lower court's decision (e.g., Clark and Strauss 2010; Carrubba, Giles and Strayhorn 2009 ). Proofs and supplemental results are gathered in the appendix.
These models allow us to answer a series of questions about the relationships among various features of the judicial hierarchy and the decisions made by courts. In particular, we are interested in how the lower court's decision on the merits and choice of rules to justify that decision, and the upper court's decisions to review and reverse the lower court choices is influenced by the degree of preference divergence between lower courts and higher courts, the relative importance of the case at hand, and the costliness of reviewing lower court decisions.
Model 0: A Myopic Lower Court
Players and sequence of play. We model law creation in the judicial hierarchy as a game between two players, the Upper Court (UC) and the Lower Court (LC), with "ideal rules" on the real number line, U and L, respectively. We assume, without loss of generality, that U = 0, and L > 0. There are three moves in the game. First, Nature draws a set of case facts, f ∈ R, from a unidimensional fact space. 3 LC observes f , but UC does not. Second, LC chooses a rule, r, which divides the fact space into dichotomous judgments. Third, UC observes r and the resulting judgment and must decide whether or not to audit LC's decision. If UC audits the decision, UC observes f and is free to select any new rule it chooses. (We assume that the judgment must be consistent with the announced rule-that judges cannot "lie" about case facts.) A strategy for the Lower Court is a rule, r ∈ R; a strategy for the Upper Court is a pair of an audit probability and a rule to select upon auditing, a(r), r UC . Because the Upper court always has a dominant strategy to select r UC = U = 0 upon review, we collapse the Upper Court's strategy into a single choice, the probability of auditing the Lower Court, a(r). To take a stylized example, we consider search and seizure cases. The fact space represents the "intrusiveness" of a search; the judgment space is the decision to either admit or exclude the evidence from the search. Specifically, a rule divides the fact space into judgments such that all cases with f ≥ r are placed into the "exclude" judgment, and all cases with f < r are placed into the "admit" judgment.
Beliefs. UC's uncertainty about f is characterized by a belief that f is distributed across the fact space according to an unbounded distribution g(·). Let b(r) represent UC's posterior belief that the disposition announced by LC corresponds with UC's preferred disposition.
Utilities. The two players receive utility from the rules they select and whether the resulting judgment results in his or her preferred judgment. A player's preferred judgment is defined by her ideal rule. Specifically, a player with ideal rule i receives −(i − r) 2 from selecting rule r; each player also receives φ > 0 if the judgment implied by her selected rule accords with her preferred outcome. Notice we have assumed a myopic lower court-LC's utility is not affected by any change to either the rule and/or judgment by UC. Finally, we also assume that UC must pay a cost, k, to audit LC's decision. This cost can represent an opportunity cost, an effort cost, or any other cost associated with auditing the lower court. In addition, it can also capture other nonspatial features of a case, such as its political or legal salience. Notice, we are implicitly assigning a weight of 1 to the rule. The values of φ, k, and the ratio of those two parameters therefore tell us the relative weights of the rule, case disposition, and review costs for the courts. The smaller φ and/or k, the greater relative importance of the legal rule to the courts. 4
Solution. We characterize the following solution to the game.
Proposition 1 (Myopic Lower Court Equilibrium) The following strategy profile constitutes the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium to the model:
This result demonstrates several very intuitive relationships. First, because we have assumed the Lower Court does not have preferences over the Upper Court's decision and instead cares only about the decision it makes, the Lower Court has a dominant strategy to select its ideal rule.
Given this dominant strategy, the Upper Court's strategy is to review a decision if the Lower Court's selected (ideal) rule is sufficiently far away from the Upper Court's ideal rule. What constitutes a sufficiently far away rule is determined by (a) the cost of reviewing the Lower Court, k, and the Upper Court's belief that it dislikes the disposition of the case.
Comparative statics. The simple myopic model yields a series of highly intuitive comparative statics. First, increasing the cost of reviewing a lower court, k, is associated with a decrease in the chances the Upper Court will review a decision. Second, as the Upper Court places increasing value on cases dispositions, relative to legal rules (i.e., as φ increases), it will be more likely to review a Lower Court decision. Third, as the degree of preference divergence between the courts increases (i.e., as L increases), the Upper Court will be (weakly) more likely to review a decision. In addition, an increase in preference divergence will be associated with a greater likelihood of reversal relative to affirmance, upon review. To see this, note that as L increases, the range of cases for which the courts disagree about the disposition increases. Thus, when the Upper Court reviews the Lower Court, it will be more likely to be reviewing a case that it wants to reverse than one where it agrees with the original disposition (and therefore would affirm the Lower Court).
To be sure, while these predictions are highly intuitive and, in some cases, essentially guaranteed by the (strong) assumptions we have made about the lower court's preferences, they serve two important functions. First, they establish a benchmark against which we can compare the predictions of our subsequent models. Second, as will become apparent later, they reveal that some of the most common empirical tests may not be discriminating among competing theories of judicial hierarchy.
Model 1: A Strategic Lower Court
We now extend the model to consider the possibility of a strategic Lower Court. That is, the Lower Court's utility is now determined by its interaction with the Upper Court, not just the decision it itself makes. While perhaps not the most elaborate extension, the substantive implications of this move bear underscoring. The key distinction between the Strategic Lower Court model and the Myopic Lower Court model is that we now assume the lower court cares ultimately about the final disposition and legal rule used in its case.
Players, sequence of play and beliefs. The players, sequence of play and beliefs in this model are identical to the baseline model.
Utilities. The Upper Court's sources of utility and utility function in this model are identical to the baseline model. The Lower Court's utility, however, is now contingent upon any moves made by UC. Specifically, rather than deriving utility necessarily from the rule it selects, LC receives utility from the rule and judgment standing at the end of the game. That is, at the end of the game, LC receives −(L − x) 2 , where x is either the rule selected by LC, if UC does not audit the decision, or the rule selected by UC if UC audits the decision. In addition, LC receives φ if and only if the judgment at the end of the game corresponds to LC's preferred judgment.
Equilibrium. To solve the model, we identify the set of isomorphic pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. 5 The set of equilibria is summarized formally below, and illustrated in Figure 1 . Note that in Figure 1 and the statement of Proposition 2, we restrict attention to the case where L > √ k. In the appendix, we derive the full equilibrium and behavior without restriction on L. All equilibrium behavior discussed below holds independent of the relative location of L, and, where relevant, we discuss the implications of L < √ k.
As can be seen in the figure, depending upon the case facts one of three outcomes obtains.
When case facts are sufficiently far to the left (f < r a ) the lower court sets a rule at r * = r a , when case facts are moderate (r a ≤ f < √ k), the Lower Court sets the rule at the case facts (r * = f ), and when case facts are sufficiently far to the right (f ≥ √ k), the Lower Court sets the rule at
(As we demonstrate in the appendix, if L < r * then the Lower Court sets the rule at L.)
The disposition is a direct consequent of the rule, so the disposition is Admit if r * = r a and Exclude otherwise. The Upper Court never reviews the Lower Court. This solution characterizes a set of equilibrium because r a can take on any value between r and r (we define these boundaries below).
That is, the Lower Court and the Upper Court can arbitrarily coordinate on any r a ∈ [r, r].
To provide intuition for this equilibrium, we first discuss the choice of rule and then the Upper Court's decision not to review. All else equal, a Lower Court prefers a rule closer to its ideal point than farther away, and it prefers a rule that yields its preferred disposition over one that does not.
However, the farther from the Upper Court's ideal point, the greater the chance that the rule is not producing the Upper Court's preferred disposition-i.e., there is a larger range of case facts for which the two courts disagree about the disposition. Courts with case facts f ≤ r a will pool on a rule in the set r to r. Specifically, r is the rule the Upper Court does not review even if it knows it is getting the undesired disposition and r is the rule the Upper Court is indifferent over reviewing given all Lower Courts with case facts less than r are pooling on that rule. 6 As noted, we characterize a continuum of isomorphic equilibria; there exists an equilibrium for any r a ∈ [r, r]. In equilibrium, when the Upper Court observes the Lower Court play r = r a and the disposition Admit, the Upper Court has beliefs that make it indifferent over reviewing the case. However, if the Upper Court observes r > r a and Admit, the Upper Court would prefer to review the case.
Thus, Lower Courts with case facts greater than r a make a different choice. If these courts choose the rule r a they will produce the disposition Exclude. Since the Upper Court knows that the Lower Court wants a more permissive standard (i.e., a rule that leads to more Admit dispositions), the Upper Court knows it wants Exclude whenever the Lower Court makes that determination. Thus, the Lower Court is in a position to choose a more favorable rule than r a . In fact, the Lower Court can choose any rule that produces the Exclude disposition up to one that the Upper Court would review solely to bring the rule back into line, r = √ k. 
Proposition 2 (Strategic Lower Court Equilibrium)
The following constitutes all pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria to the model:
and judgment is admit 0 otherwise Court had divergent preferences, but was well disciplined by the threat of review; however, neither of these conditions hold here. Instead, here the Lower Court has divergent preferences and is able to deviate from the Upper Court's preferences by strategically balancing dispositions and rules.
Thus, this result suggests that just examining the disposition of the case may not be particularly useful, since Lower Court behavior on the disposition would be observationally equivalent across these three scenarios.
The Lower Court's choice of rule also has a straightforward relationship with the case facts; the farther right the case facts, the farther right the Lower Court's rule. However, this relationship is deceptive for the exact opposite reason; while it sounds innocuous it is anything but. This relationship tells us that the Lower Court's ability to set rules divergent from the Upper Court's preferences actually depends upon the case facts of that particular case! Neither a Lower Court with aligned preferences nor a well-disciplined Lower Court with divergent preferences would be expected to engage in this behavior. Thus, while knowing the disposition of the case is not necessarily useful
for evaluating to what degree the Supreme Court can ensure compliant decision making by Lower Courts, knowing the rules being produced by the lower can be.
Finally, how much influence lower courts can have upon the law depends on more than just the case facts. First, it depends upon the costliness of review, k. As the cost of review increases, all else equal the upper court allows a more divergent rule, because each of the relevant thresholds-r, r, and √ k-is increasing in k. The intuition is straightforward: the more costly review, the lower the expected value of reviewing the case, and therefore the more slack the Lower Court has in setting a rule. Lower court influence on the rule also depends upon how much the Upper Court cares about the disposition of the particular case. However, counter-intuitively, the more the Upper Court cares about the disposition relative to the rule being produced, the less influence the Lower Court has on the rule. To see why, first notice that the Upper Court's intensity of preferences over the disposition (φ) has no impact on the rule when the case facts are sufficiently far right (f > r a ). In this case the Upper Court knows it is getting its preferred disposition and the Lower Court is simply pulling the rule towards its ideal point as much as possible. How much it can do so solely depends upon the costs of review. The disposition comes into play when the case facts are sufficiently close to the Upper Court's most preferred rule (f ≤ r a ). Here, the more the upper court cares about the disposition, the stronger the incentive for the upper court to review and therefore the more deferential the Lower Court must be in its choice of review. Thus, the more the Upper Court cares about the disposition, the (weakly) less influence the Lower Court has on the law. 7
In sum, in this model the lower courts play an important role in creating law by selecting the legal rules that will constitute judge-made law. This influence, of course, is not unconstrained.
The lower courts are subject to the constraints and incentives created by the presence of a higher court with the power to review its decisions. And, as noted above, these incentives arise absent an assumption that being reviewed is in-and-of-itself costly. Rather, the constraints on their discretion arise because of their interest in controlling the law and not invoking Supreme Court law-making.
Model 2: Uncertainty About Upper Court Preferences
Given the structure of the previous model, although no review happens in equilibrium we might perfectly in order to avoid review, the model with a variable cost of review allows auditing to take place in equilibrium. As we describe below, we derive not just the possibility of review but also a variety of counter-intuitive equilibrium relationships over the use of review. 
Equilibrium. To solve the model, we again identify the set of isomorphic pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. 9 The set of equilibria is characterized in Figure 2 . 10 As in the previous model, we again restrict attention to the case where L > √ k in the formal statement of the equilibrium and Figure 2 . We also assume a particular ordering of the various cutpoints to be explained below; these restrictions are for illustrative purposes and do not affect the equilibria or their substantive interpretation.
As can be seen in the figure, there are several cases that may obtain. The crucial point here is the Lower Court now must choose between a risk-avoiding strategy and a risk-seeking strategy.
The risk-avoiding strategy is shown by the solid line in Figure 2 ; the risk-seeking strategy is shown by the dotted line. Conditional upon choosing one of those two possible strategies, one of three cases may obtain-these three cases are isomorphic to the three cases from the previous model.
When the case facts are sufficiently far to the left (i.e., when f < r a i ), the Lower Court pools on r * = r a i , where i = h if the Lower Court pursues the risk-seeking strategy and i = l if the Lower Court pursues the risk-avoiding strategy. While Lower Courts with case facts f < 0 would prefer to separate from those with case facts f ∈ [0, r a )-in order to reveal to the Upper Court that the Upper Court is receiving its preferred disposition and thereby enable itself to set a preferable By contrast, when the case facts are sufficiently far to the right (i.e., f > r a i ), this pooling behavior cannot be sustained, because upon observing the disposition Admit, the Upper Court believes it is too likely that it is not receiving its preferred disposition and would review the Lower Court's decision. Thus, the Lower Court's best response is to offer as desirable a rule as possible (from its own perspective) while yielding the disposition
however when f > √ k i , the Lower Court's best response is to set r * = √ k i . This behavior is shown in Regions III-V in Figure 2 .
If the Lower Court chooses the risk-avoiding strategy, review never occurs in equilibrium. This is because the Lower Court selects a rule that it knows even a low-cost type would not review.
The implication is that in the event the Upper Court is a high-cost type, the Lower Court could have selected a more preferable rule and not been reviewed. However, because the Lower Court's prior belief was sufficiently pessimistic (i.e., it believed the Upper Court was too likely to be a low-cost type), the Lower Court chose to avoid any chance of review. By contrast, if the Lower Court pursues the risk-seeking strategy, then review occurs in equilibrium with positive probability.
In particular, if the Upper Court is a low-cost type, when the Lower Court plays r * = r a h , the Upper Court will review; it will reverse the Lower Court when f ∈ [0, r a h ] and affirm when f < 0.
Similarly, when the Lower Court plays r * = √ k h , the Upper Court will review 11 and affirm the Lower Court.
Proposition 3 (Stochastic Cost of Review Equilibrium)
The following characterizes all pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria to the model.
The Lower Court's equilibrium strategy is given by:
The Upper Court's equilibrium strategy is given by:
The Upper Court's beliefs are given by: The characteristics of the equilibria to this model are instructive on several points. First, each of the intuitions from the previous model carries through to this model. However, the purchase of this model derives from some of the additional dynamics that were not present in the previous model. Chief among these is that review occurs in equilibrium in the model of stochastic costs of review. While not striking on its face-uncertainty about the cost of review intuitively leads to a non-zero chance of review in equilibrium-the dynamics that follow are striking.
Consider first Regions I and II in Figure 2 . In these regions, the Lower Court always pools on a rule-which rule it pools on is determined by the Lower Court's decision to pursue either the risk-seeking or risk-avoiding strategy. If it pursues the risk-seeking strategy (the dotted line), review occurs with positive probability. Sometimes the Upper Court will reverse the Lower Court (Region II), but sometimes it will affirm the Lower Court (Region I). The logic here is that the Upper Court is strategically auditing these cases-it believes it is too likely that it has not received its preferred disposition and prefers to review the case. As in all situations of auditing under incomplete information, there will be instances in which the Upper Court reviews and learns that it would have preferred not to-i.e., it prefers not to reverse the Lower Court. If the Upper Court had known it was receiving its preferred disposition (i.e., f < 0), then it would have been willing to accept the Lower Court's rule. Notice that the upper boundary of Region II is given by r l , which is decreasing in φ. This implies that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the extent to which the Upper Court cares about the disposition, the greater the ratio of affirmances to reversals! This finding is quite counter-intuitive.
Consider next behavior in Region V. Here, if the Lower Court pursues the risk-seeking strategy (i.e., it continues the separating strategy through √ k h and then pools on √ k h ), then review happens with positive probability (whenever the Upper Court is a low-cost type). A remarkable feature of the Upper Court's strategy in this case is that it is reviewing cases it intends to affirm. This is because, in contrast with standard principal-agent models of the judiciary (e.g., Cameron, Segal and Songer 2000; Haire, Songer and Lindquist 2003; Clark 2009 ), in our model the Supreme Court cares not just about the case disposition but also about the rule used to reach that disposition. As a consequence, the Court will sometimes review cases where it believes it agrees with the disposition but is willing to spend the effort to change the rule used by the Lower Court. That is, in equilibrium, affirmances are not simply the product of cases where the Upper Court would have preferred ex post to not have reviewed the Lower Court; rather they can occur intentionally. Our model is the first, to our knowledge, that predicts such behavior.
More generally, the equilibrium reveals that the various model parameters' effects on review and reversal are complex. For example, as the cost of review decreases, the ratio of affirmances to reversals increases. To see this, consider the cost of review for a high cost Upper Court, k h . As the cost of review for a high cost Upper Court decreases, the lower boundary on Region V (
moves to the left; at the same time, so, too, does the (theoretically maximum lower boundary on Region IV), r h . However, because
< 0, the lower boundary on Region V is decreasing at a faster rate than the lower boundary on Region IV. Thus, the ratio of affirmances to reversals will increase as the cost of review decreases. Intuition may suggest this relationship-when it is less costly to review, the Upper Court will be more likely to affirm lower cases. However, intuition may suggest this relationship for any number of reasons-chief among them that the Upper Court will be willing to review more cases where it is more likely the Upper Court prefers to affirm. The intuition behind this relationship in our model, by contrast, is different. The intuition behind this relationship here is that as the cost of review decreases, the Lower Court gives the Upper Court more on the legal rule, in which case the Upper Court is simply more likely to get its preferred disposition and therefore can shift its efforts to cases where it wants to modify the legal rule while affirming the Lower Court's disposition.
Consider next the divergence of preferences between the Lower Court and the Upper Court, L. 12 Following from the preceding discussion, the effect of divergence between the Upper Court and the Lower Court on the ratio of affirmances to reversals is more complex than intuition might suggest. When the Lower Court and Upper Court are perfectly aligned (i.e., L = 0), then there will be no review or reversal. However, as the Lower Court becomes more divergent (i.e., as L increases), the range of case facts that will trigger review and reversal grows, while the range of case facts that will trigger review and affirmance does not change. However, there reaches a point at which the Lower Court becomes no more likely to be reviewed and reversed (when L > r a ).
Ultimately, as L continues to increase, the range of case facts that will trigger review begins to increase again, but now affirmed (when L enters Region V). Thus, the effect of Upper CourtLower Court divergence on the ratio of affirmances to reversals is non-monotonic. Similarly, the effect of preference divergence on the rate of review is non-monotonic; at first the chance of review is (weakly) decreasing in preference divergence; then the change of review is increasing. This finding reveals a previous unappreciated subtlety in the anticipated empirical relationship between commonly explored observable features of the judicial hierarchy. This parameter has a similar effect on an even more frequently considered behavior-case dispositions. When the Upper Court and the Lower Court are perfectly aligned (i.e., L = 0), then the Lower Court will never be reviewed and reversed-it has a strictly dominant strategy to offer its ideal rule, which is also the Upper Court's ideal rule. However, as the Lower Court and Upper Court become more ideologically divergent (i.e., as L increases), then the Lower Court should become more likely to be reviewed and reversed. Notice, this implies that as the ideological distance between the Upper Court and the Lower Court increases, the Lower Court should be no less likely to offer its preferred disposition. This occurs because the Lower Court trades off between the legal rule and the disposition. This finding has direct implications for studies of compliance which focus exclusively on dispositions. It implies that even while the Lower Court's behavior is influenced by the Upper Court, we may not see a correlation between divergence and case dispositions. Given the centrality of such a conjectured relationship in the literature on judicial hierarchy, this finding represents an important consideration for future empirical studies.
The relationship, however, is slightly more complicated by the existence of Regions III-V. Once the Lower Court is sufficiently divergent (i.e., L > r a ), then the Lower Court should reverse its approach by offering the Upper Court its preferred disposition in favor of securing a better legal rule. As with the case of the ratio of affirmances to reversals, the implication here is that the effect of Upper Court-Lower Court divergence on case dispositions should be non-monotonic-at lower levels of divergence, the Upper Court's preferences should be inversely correlated with case outcomes, while at higher levels of divergence, the Upper Court's preferences should be positively correlated with case outcomes.
Implications
The models developed in the preceding section yield a number of theoretical and empirical implications that merit closer consideration. First, and perhaps most considerably, the model reconceptualizes the incentives facing judges in the lower courts. Most previous studies of compliance in a judicial hierarchy have posited a "reversal cost" associated with being reversed (e.g., Cameron, Segal and Songer 2000) . It is this reversal cost that induces compliance with the higher court.
Often conceptualized as a cultural or reputation cost, we have instead endogenized the cost of being reversed. In particular, we have assumed no cultural or reputation cost associated with being reversed. Rather, the cost of being reversed is simply the policy cost of having the Upper Court set a legal rule with which the Lower Court disagrees (to a variable extent).
A second implication is directly related. We have shifted the focus of the literature on judicial hierarchy in two ways. First, we have shifted the focus from case dispositions to legal rules; second, we have shifted from a top-down approach to a bottom-up approach. The insights we derive from this re-focusing are several. Chief among the implications is that the relationship between the legal rule and the disposition is complicated. While scholars have been widely interested in legal rules, at least theoretically (e.g., Lax 2007; Staton and Vanberg 2008) , less attention has been paid to them empirically. Instead, as a proxy, many studies have used case dispositions. In the context of judicial hierarchy, our models demonstrate that the disposition can in fact be quite misleading. In fact, as the Lower Court moves the rule further away from the Upper Court's preferred rule, it must compensate by doing so in cases that allow it to give the Upper Court its preferred disposition.
Thus, the disposition can actually be inversely correlated with the legal rule used by the Lower Court. This finding has myriad implications for studies of compliance in the judicial hierarchy which consider only the disposition of cases in the lower courts to the exclusion of the legal rules employed to reach those dispositions.
A related implication of our models is that the Upper Court will sometimes review a case that it intends to affirm. In the model of stochastic review costs, an Upper Court with low review costs will review a rule that is too far away from its ideal rule, knowing that it agrees with the case disposition (Region V). This stands in stark contrast to standard principal-agent theories of the judicial hierarchy, in which the affirmance of a Lower Court decision follows only from review of a case with which the Upper Court expected to disagree. Of course, that can happen in our model, too (Region I). Nevertheless, some research has suggested that relying on affirmances to understand the Supreme Court's motivations may be misleading, because affirmances occur primarily because of incomplete information on the part of the Supreme Court (McGuire et al. 2009 ). This result calls that logic into question.
Note also that review happens in the model of stochastic review costs not probabilistically, but rather when the Lower Court takes a risky strategy and happens to draw a "low cost" Upper Court.
That is, review does not happen as part of a mixing strategy but rather in the context of a Lower Court that is trying to "get away" with the best rule it can but happens to have underestimated how much the Supreme Court cares about a case or how willing the Supreme Court is to review a decision. Some recent research has begun to explore the determinants, and consequences, of variable costs of review (e.g., Clark and Strauss 2010; Carrubba, Giles and Strayhorn 2009). The logic underpinning these analyses is that the Court has a finite amount of resources and therefore must decide how to allocate them across a set of potential cases. Previous models of the judicial hierarchy generally assume known costs of review; however, recent research on docket allocation suggests good reasons for doubting this assumption. Our analysis, in turn, suggests there may be considerable implications that follow from uncertainty about the cost of review.
The models developed here also offer several implications for the empirical analysis of lawmaking and compliance in a judicial hierarchy. Empirical investigations of strategic models of judicial decision-making in the lower courts have focused most squarely on the question whether the Supreme Court's preferences influence the decisions made by lower courts. These analyses have considered the disposition of cases in the lower courts (Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek 2004) or the selection of legal rules (Klein 2002) . Our analysis suggests, however, that an empirical analysis focused on either one or the other of these decisions cannot discriminate between myopic and strategic lower court behavior. For example, as the Lower Court and the Upper Court in our model become more divergent (as L increases), the Lower Court may be able to pull the rule towards its own preferred rule, if it can reach the Upper Court's preferred disposition in doing so.
On the other hand, the Lower Court may be able to get its preferred disposition by trading off the legal rule. The bottom line is that evidence that variation in the Supreme Court's preferences is not strongly correlated with either case dispositions or legal rules is insufficient to demonstrate the absence of sophisticated behavior by lower court judges.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we provide an empirical analysis of the model developed above. Specifically, we consider two of the substantively most intriguing, and counter-intuitive, relationships in the model: the relationships between the ideological divergence of the lower court and the likelihood of (i) review and (ii) reversal. 13 First, concerning the probability that the Supreme Court reviews a lower court, the model predicts that the probability of review will initially (weakly) decline in ideological distance and then increase in ideological distance. To see this, consider again Figure 2 . As the lower court diverges from the Supreme Court, the size of Regions II and III expands. As the lower court continues to diverge, ultimately Regions II and III stop growing, and Region IV, where review never occurs, begins to grow. However, as it continues to diverge, Region V comes into existence and grows, where review again occurs. Thus, we predict a non-monotonic relationship between lower court-Supreme Court divergence and the probability a decision is reviewed.
Hypothesis 1 (Non-Monotonic Review) Ideological distance between the Supreme Court and the lower court has a non-monotonic effect of the probability of review. The likelihood of review should initially decrease and then increase in ideological distance.
We note that this prediction contrasts with the Myopic Lower Court model, which predicts a monotonically increasing rate of review in ideological divergence.
Second, concerning the rate of reversal, we also predict a non-monotonic relationship. Again, consider Figure 2 ; as the lower court diverges from the Supreme Court, the size of regions Regions II and III increases, which implies a greater chance of reversal. When the lower court enters Region IV, there is no change in the chance rate of reversal, but as the lower court enters Region V, the Supreme Court begins to affirm, rather than reverse, the lower court. Thus, we predict a non-monotonic relationship between lower court-Supreme Court divergence and the probability a decision is reviewed.
Hypothesis 2 (Non-Monotonic Reversal) Ideological distance between the Supreme Court and the lower court has a non-monotonic effect of the probability of reversal. The likelihood of reversal should initially increase and then decrease in ideological distance.
Data
The data for our analysis come from several sources. First, to create a dataset of cases, we combine the Phase I and Phase II of the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database . Phase I is a dataset containing a random sample of cases decided by the court of appeals between 1925 and 1996; Phase II is a dataset containing every court of appeals decision subsequently reviewed by the Supreme Court.
By combining these two databases, we have a set of cases, some of which were reviewed by the Supreme Court, providing the variation needed to test Hypothesis 1. However, we also need to know whether the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed or reversed the Court of Appeals decision, and this information is not provided in the Phase II database. It is provided, however, in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database. Unfortunately, there is no link between these databases. Thus, we traced every case in the Phase II database to its Supreme Court decision and linked the Supreme Court database with our combined Court of Appeals database. 14 We then create two variables, reviewed i and reversed i , which equal 0 if the Supreme Court did not review or did not reverse case i, respectively, and 1 if the Supreme Court did review or did reverse case i Because we have sampled differentially across cases reviewed and cases not reviewed (i.e., we have a random sample of cases not reviewed but the universe of reviewed cases), the assembled dataset constitutes a choice-based, or case-control sample. Such data pose an important consideration for statistical analysis, as inferences drawn may be biased. Specifically, the estimate of the intercept in a multiple regression may be biased. However, the sampling strategy does not bias the estimate of the slope parameters, allowing us to perform hypothesis tests on the correlation between parameters and outcomes, when inference does not depend on the intercept (Jewell 2004, 212-4) . None of our hypotheses require us to make claims about the absolute level of review, and therefore we can proceed without any adjustment to a standard statistical approach.
The Raw Data
We begin our empirical investigation of these hypotheses by considering the raw data. Figure 3 shows a nonlinear scatterplot smoother (loess) for each of the two relationships. Specifically, this figure shows the relationship between the ideological distance from the lower panel to the Supreme Court and (i) the probability of review and (ii) the probability of reversal. A striking pattern emerges. As predicted, the probability of review is initially decreasing in ideological distance and then increasing. The probability of review initially decreases in ideological distance and then increases. (As noted above, while the correlation between the parameters and outcomes are not biased in a choice-based sample, the intercept may be. Thus, one cannot make any conclusive claims about the absolute levels of review reported here.) By contrast, but again as predicted, the probability of reversal is initially increasing in ideological distance and then decreasing. These patterns in the raw data strongly support the two non-monotonic predictions described by Hypotheses 1 and 2.
With this evidence in hand, we now turn to an empirical model.
Estimation
To further assess these relationships, we directly model our two hypotheses. A structural estimation of the model would require us to fully operationalize all of the model's parameters and behaviors in order to assess from which region in Figure 2 each observation is made; such a task poses myriad measurement challenges that are beyond the scope of a single paper. 17 Thus, we focus on modeling the implications captured by Hypotheses 1 and 2. Specifically, we empirically model the Supreme Court's two, related decisions. First, it must decide whether to review a case and, then, if so, whether to affirm or reverse the case. To do so, we develop an estimator that is customized to the Supreme Court's choice set.
Following our hypotheses, we model the probability that the Supreme Court reviews a case as a function of the ideological distance between the Supreme Court and the panel that decided the case. We include both distance i and distance 2 i as predictors of review to capture the non-monotonic relationship predicted by Hypothesis 1. In addition, existing literature suggests that the presence of a dissenting opinion on the court below is correlated with both ideological distance and the decision to review a case (e.g. Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek 2004); thus we also include an indicator for whether a dissent was written in the case below. 18 Formally, we model the probability a case is reviewed as a logistic function of these covariates as follows:
Similarly, we model the probability a case is reversed, upon review, as a function of ideological distance between the lower court and the Supreme Court. Formally, we model the probability of reversal as a logistic function of these covariates as follows:
Effect of Ideological Distance on Probability of Review
Distance Again, we include both distance i and distance 2 i as predictors of review to capture the nonmonotonic relationship predicted by Hypothesis 2. Given these representations, the likelihood model 19 for the data is then given by
( 1) and the log-likelihood can be written as
We program and maximize the log-likelihood in R.
Results
The results of our estimation are reported in Table 1 . These estimates reveal a striking pattern.
Consider first the review parameters (the β's). Our estimates suggest evidence in support of Hypothesis 1; the negative estimate of β 1 and the positive estimate of β 2 indicate that the probability of review is a non-monotonic function of distance i -the probability of review is initially decreasing and then increasing as the courts become more ideologically divergent. In fact, the substantive magnitude of this effect is considerable, as is demonstrated in the top-left panel in Figure 4 . Assuming the lower court is unanimous, as a lower court becomes more ideologically divergent, the probability of review initially decreases but then begins to increase. (Of course, as noted above, the case-control design limits our ability to make inferences about the absolute level of review.)
The bottom-left panel in Figure 4 , moreover, shows the marginal effect of ideological distance on the probability of review. As predicted, the marginal effect of preference divergence changes from a negative effect at low levels of divergence to an increasingly positive effect at high levels of di-vergence. As can be seen the effect is negative at low levels of divergence and positive at higher values. This differential effect of ideological distance on the probability of review is precisely what was predicted in Hypothesis 1.
Consider next our estimates of the reversal parameters (the γ's). Again, we find support for our hypothesis; the positive estimated coefficient associated with distance i and the negative estimated coefficient associated with distance 2 i together indicate a pattern whereby the probability of reversal initially increases as the courts become more divergent and then decreases. This relationship is shown visually in the top-right panel in Figure 4 . As the figure shows, the probability of reversing a decision that has been reviewed increases as the lower court becomes more divergent from about 40% to nearly 55%; as the lower court becomes increasingly distant, however, the probability of reversal drops to about 35%. The bottom-right panel shows the marginal effect of ideological divergence across the range of observed divergence. As predicted, the marginal effect of preference divergence changes from a positive effect at low levels of divergence to an increasingly negative effect at high levels of divergence. 20 This empirical pattern comports with the expectation outlined in Hypothesis 2, providing additional support for the (counter-intuitive) predictions derived from the theoretical model.
The implication of these empirical findings is considerable. As noted above, many of the standard tests used in the literature to assess whether the lower courts have strategic or myopic preferences cannot discriminate among various accounts of judicial behavior. In particular, by considering dispositions or rules alone, those studies risk potentially missing important dynamics. Our theoretical model, by incorporating those joint considerations reveals a series of discriminating predictions, and the analysis here reveals striking support for those hypotheses. In short, the analysis presented here provides the most powerful evidence to date of the presence of strategic preferences in the judicial hierarchy.
Conclusion
A major area of inquiry in the study of American politics concerns rule-making in a hierarchical institution. Perhaps chief among the substantively compelling institutions implicated are the courts.
With broad powers for law-making, the ways in which the judicial hierarchy shapes or constrains Figure 4: Substantive effect of ideological distance on probability of review and reversal. The top two panels shows the substantive magnitude of the estimated effect of ideological divergence between the Supreme Court and the lower panel on the probability of review and on the probability of reversal; estimates come from empirical model (2). The bottom two panels show the marginal effect of ideological distance on the probability of review and reversal across the observed values of ideological distance; dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals.
judicial decisions has broad implications for understanding much of the law. As noted at the outset of this paper, the courts of appeals are often the final voice on important legal questions. We have developed a model of Supreme Court-lower court interactions that goes beyond existing theory.
By combining a theoretical analysis of rule creation with a bottom-up perspective on the judicial hierarchy, we have uncovered a variety of striking features about the way in which law is created by lower courts. Our analysis yields a number of equilibrium predictions about judicial behavior that intuition predicts should exist yet no previous theory can explain. For example, our model predicts that the Supreme Court will intentionally review and affirm lower courts in order to alter the legal rule used in their decisions. In addition, our model highlights several difficulties with previous empirical strategies to assessing compliance and strategic behavior in the judicial hierarchy. What is more, a number of the results and comparative statics that derive from our analysis run against modal perceptions and intuitions, and lead naturally to new empirical tests that future research can, and should, contemplate.
An empirical analysis of two of the model's most striking predictions has yielded direct support for the model's counter-intuitive predictions. Specifically, we have shown that there is a nonmonotonic relationship between ideological divergence and both the likelihood of review and the likelihood of reversal. As lower courts become more divergent, they become at first less likely to be reviewed and then more likely to be reviewed. On the other hand, as lower courts become more divergent, they become first more likely, but then less likely, to be reversed. While only investigating a limited set of the model's predictions, the evidence is striking.
Nevertheless, there remains work to be done. While we believe them significant in-and-ofthemselves, the findings reported here are but one step forward. The results of this study can, and should, be incorporated into the broader literatures on the development of law (e.g., Lax
2007; Kornhauser 1992), judicial compliance and top-down rule-making (e.g., Cameron, Segal and Songer 2000; Clark 2009 ), and the structure of legal rules (e.g., Staton and Vanberg 2008; Lax 2009 ). However, short of that future research, this study yields a series of important lessons about the judicial hierarchy. Perhaps most important, the evidence reveals that strategic considerations by the lower courts lead to more nuanced incentives and patterns of behavior than standard models would predict. With these lessons in hand, scholars may be able to push forward the already fruitful debate about the degree to which strategic incentives affect judicial decision-making.
Proofs and Supplemental Results
Proof. Proof of Proposition 1. First notice that because UC's decision cannot affect LC's utility, it is always optimal for LC to select r = L. This gives LC the best possible rule and always results in LC's preferred judgment. Thus, U LC (r = L) = φ; this is the best possible utility for LC. It is optimal for UC to audit LC's decision only when U UC (audit) ≥ EU UC (¬audit). By the utility function defined above, U SC (audit) = φ − k. UC's expected utility from not auditing depends on the rule selected by LC and whether the realized case facts and judgment implied by r correspond to UC's preferred judgment. When UC observes the rule r = L and the judgment "exclude" (E), then UC knows that f > L. Given f > L, UC prefers the judgement E. Thus,
Thus, upon observing E, UC prefers to audit only when k ≤ L 2 . When UC observes r = L and the judgment "admit" (A), then UC's expected utility from not auditing depends on the realized case facts and the rule selected by LC. Specifically,
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2. Note, Proposition 2 characterizes a continuum of isomorphic equilibria, where there are three cases. The cases are determined by a cut-point in the fact space,
To characterize equilibrium behavior, we first establish a series of intermediate results.
Lemma 1
The Upper Court reviews a case whenever r ≥ k
Proof. U UC (review|r) = φ − k and EU UC (¬review|r) = −r 2 + bφ, where b is the Upper Courts beliefs over the probability that the Lower Court has declared a rule that yields the Upper Court's preferred disposition. The parameter b is a decreasing function of r; by Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem a solution to this equality exists. The Upper Court reviews a case whenever The Upper Court is indifferent over changing the rule when it knows it is getting its preferred disposition when r = √ k.
Corollary 2 The Upper Court does not review if
Proof. The Upper Court prefers not to review for
Lemma 2 The Lower Court never prefers to be reviewed.
Proof. This proof is constructed in three steps. First, the Lower Court never offers r < 0.
If the Lower Court offers r = 0, the Upper Court never reviews (U UC (¬review|r = 0) = φ > U UC (review|r = 0) = φ − k). If the Lower Court offers r < 0 and is reviewed, the Lower Court gets the same outcome as if it set r = 0. If the Lower Court offers r < 0 and is not reviewed, the Lower Court is strictly worse off. If , and we know ∂b ∂r < 0 for r > 0, and therefore EU UC is decreasing in r.
Since the Lower Court never has an incentive to offer a rule outside of the Pareto set, the Lower
Court never prefers to be reviewed. If
Corollary 3 By proof of Lemma 2, the Lower Court never makes an offer outside the Pareto set,
Lemma 3 For f ≥ √ k, the Lower Court's sequentially rational move is to offer r = √ k.
Proof. Consider first f > L. By Corollary 1, the Upper Court reviews if and only if r ≥ √ k. By Lemma 2, the Lower Court never prefers to be reviewed. The rule closest to the Lower Court's most preferred rule that will not be reviewed is r = √ k. Consider next √ k ≤ f ≤ L. By Corollary 1, the largest rule that the Upper Court will not review is r = √ k. By Lemma 2, the Lower Court never prefers to be reviewed. Thus, a Lower Court with case facts
Lemma 4 Lemma 5 Given the possible equilibrium behavior defined in 4, the beliefs that can support this behavior are as follows. On equilibrium path, upon observing (r * , Admit),
. Off equilibrium path, upon observing (0 ≤ r < r * , Admit), b can cover the entire support. Off equilibrium path, upon observing (r * < r < r, Admit), b * ≤ r 2 −k+φ φ must hold.
Proof. For (r * , Admit), r * is on equilibrium path and so beliefs must be updated by Bayes Rule.
. For (0 ≤ r < r * , Admit), the Lower Court always prefers offering r * to any deviation to the left. Thus, Upper Court moves and beliefs are unconstrained in this range.
Finally, for (r * < r < r, Admit), the Upper Court must prefer to review the rule in equilibrium, otherwise the Lower Court would deviate to r . The Upper Court prefers to review whenever it believes the likelihood of a reversal on disposition is sufficiently high. By Lemma 1, this condition holds whenever b * ≤ r 2 −k+φ φ =b holds.
Lemma 6 For a Lower Court with case facts r * < f < √ k, the optimal r is the one closest to L for which the disposition is Exclude, r = f .
Proof. If a Lower Court with case facts r * < f < √ k sets the rule greater than f , the disposition would be Admit. As proven in Lemma 5, upon observing (r > r * , Admit) the Upper Court reviews and holds off equilibrium path beliefs b ≤ r 2 −k+φ φ . Thus, the Lower Court sets the rule at the largest value which would yield a disposition of Exclude and not be reviewed, r = f .
With these intermediate results established, we now demonstrate equilibrium behavior in each of the three cases. Case 1 (f ≥ √ k): By Lemma 3, r * = √ k, which leads to the disposition Exclude.
By Corollary 1, UC does not review the rule. To see that LC never has an incentive to deviate, consider first a deviation to any r < r * . For any beliefs and any move by UC, LC is strictly worse off. Consider next a deviation to any r > r * . By Corollary 1, UC reviews this rule. By Lemma 2, LC never prefers to be reviewed and therefore has no incentive to deviate to r > r * .
Case 2 (f < r A ∈ [r, r]): By Lemma 4, LC picks r * = r A , which leads to the disposition Admit. By Lemma 5, upon observing (r * , Admit),
. By Lemma 4, b * > r 2 −k+φ φ and therefore UC does not review.
Suppose a deviation to r < r * . For any beliefs and any move by UC, LC is strictly worse off. Now, consider a deviation to r where L > r > r * . By Lemma 5, b ∈ [0, b] , and UC reviews. By
Lemma 2, LC never prefers to be reviewed. Therefore, there is no incentive to deviate. Finally, suppose a deviation to r > L. By Corollary 3, LC will never deviate to any r > L. UC's beliefs and moves are unconstrained.
In this case, r * = f . r * = f gives a disposition of Exclude. r * = f, Exclude implies f ≥ r * , and therefore b = 1. By Lemma 6, LC has no incentive to deviate from r * in either direction.
Lemma 7 Given Proposition 2, if L ≥ r * (f ), the the behavior characterized by Proposition 2 holds in equilibrium; if L < r * (f ), then the following strategy characterizes the Lower Court's strategy in all perfect Bayesian equilibria: Proof. Proof of Proposition 3. Note, as in Proposition 2, we characterize a continuum of isomorphic equilibria, where there are multiple cases. To characterize equilibrium behavior in any one of these isomorphic equilibria, we first establish a series of intermediate results.
Lemma 8
The dominant strategies characterized by Lemmas 1 and 2, as well as their corollaries, continue to hold in this model by subscripting the k parameter with k i , i = l, h.
Proof. The Upper Court's objective function has not changed, except that the cost parameter, k is now subscripted by the Upper Court's type. Substituting in a subscripted k parameter does not alter the Upper Court's dominant strategies described by Lemma 1.
Lemma 9 All equilibria 22 must involve pooling by Lower Courts with case facts f < 0 and the subset of Lower Courts with case facts 0 < f < r A over a rule in the set [r l , r h ].
Proof. Define r i = √ k i − φ and r i = k i − (1 − b)φ, where i = l, h. If a Lower Court with case facts f ≤ r h offers r ≥ r h , the Upper Court always reviews (Lemma 1 and k l < k h ). The Upper
Court never reviews any rule where 0 ≤ r ≤ r l (Corollary 2, Lemma 8, and k l < k h ). Since the Lower Court never prefers to be reviewed (Lemma 2 and 8), and the Lower Court wants a rule as close to its ideal rule as possible, we therefore know r ∈ [r l , r h ] must hold. Whether r h or r l is the lower boundary on this range depends upon if
holds. Substituting in for r h and r l , and solving for p yields Suppose, on the other hand, the Lower Court with case facts f ≤ 0 is playing r ∈ (r l , r h ]. A Lower Court with case facts 0 < f < r strictly prefers to offer r = r over offering r ≤ r h since 
Lemma 10 Given the possible equilibrium behavior defined in Lemma 9, beliefs that can support this behavior are as follows. On equilibrium path, upon observing (r * , Admit),
. If r * ≤ r l , upon observing the off equilibrium path play (0 ≤ r < r * , Admit), b can cover the entire support. If r * ∈ (r l , r h ], upon observing the off equilibrium path play (0 ≤ r < r * , Admit), b
. Off equilibrium path, upon observing (r * < r < r h , Admit), b can cover
When r * ≤ r l , for (0 ≤ r < r * , Admit) the Lower Court always prefers offering r * to any deviation to the left. Thus, Upper Court moves and beliefs are unconstrained in this range. When r * ∈ (r l , r h ], for (0 ≤ r < r * , Admit) the Lower Court prefers r * to any deviation to the left as long as an Upper
Court with k i = k l prefers to review the deviation. By Lemmas 1 and 8, this condition holds
holds. Finally, for (r * < r < r h , Admit), the Upper Court with k i = k h must prefer to review the rule in equilibrium, otherwise the Lower Court would deviate to r . The Upper Court prefers to review whenever it believes the likelihood of a reversal on disposition is sufficiently high. By Lemmas 1 and 8, this condition holds whenever b * ≤ r 2 −k h +φ φ =b holds. Note that the beliefs described here are sufficient, but not necessarily necessary for the behavior in Lemma 9 to be sequentially rational.
Lemma 11 There are multiple types of equilibria that may exist, but we focus on those where courts with f < 0 always pools on a single r. Lemma 12 For a Lower Court with case facts r A i < f < √ k i , where i = l if p ≥p and i = h otherwise, the optimal r is the largest one for which the disposition is Exclude, r = f .
Proof. If a Lower Court with case facts r A < f < √ k i sets the rule greater than f , the disposition would be Admit. As proven in Lemma 10, upon observing (r > r A , Admit) the Upper Court reviews and holds off equilibrium path beliefs b ≤
. Thus, the Lower Court sets the rule at the largest value which would yield a disposition of Exclude and not be reviewed, r = f .
Lemma 13 A Lower Court with case facts
and r = f otherwise.
Proof. By Corollary 1, the Upper Court reviews if and only if r > √ k i . Thus, if the Lower Court offers r ≤ √ k l , the Lower Court receives −(l − r) 2 If the Lower Court offers r ∈ [ √ k l , f], the Upper Court reviews iff k = k l , and the Lower Court receives −pL 2 −(1−p)(L−r) 2 Thus, the Lower Court sets the rule closest to its most preferred rule that ensures neither type of Upper Court reviews the
, and r = f otherwise. By Lemmas 2 and 8, the Lower Court never prefers to choose a rule that is reviewed with certainty, so no other behavior obtains.
Lemma 14 A Lower Court with case facts
Proof. This proof is the same as the lemma above, except for the fact that the Lower Court gets reviewed with certainty for any r > r h and so the best risky proposal the Lower Court can make is r = r h .
Lemma 15 For f > L, the Lower Court's sequentially rational move is to offer r = √ k i where i = l if p ≥p and i = h otherwise.
Proof. By corollary 1, the Upper Court reviews if and only if r > √ k i . By Lemmas 2 and 8, the Lower Court never prefers to be reviewed when k is known. Thus, the Lower Court either sets the rule closest to its most preferred rule that ensures neither type of Upper Court reviews the case (r = √ k l ) or that only the Upper Court with low costs, k l reviews the case (r = √ k h ).
The Lower Court offers
. Solving for p yields p ≥p. Now, consider five cases. Case 1 (f < r A l ): By Lemma 9, the Lower Court pools on r A l ∈ [r l , r l ] if p >p, which leads to a disposition of Admit. If, however, p ≤p, the Lower Court pools on Case 4 ( √ k l ≤ f < √ k h ): By Lemma 13, the Lower Court will play r = √
. Otherwise, the Lower Court will continue to play its separating strategy and offer r = f . In either case, this leads to a disposition of Exclude. By 
Notes
1 The interest among students of the Supreme Court in inter-circuit conflict, along with the Supreme Court's attention to inter-circuit conflict, for example, demonstrate to some extent the fact of law creation in the lower courts.
2 Note, Klein assumes that ideological alignment refers to the idea that a particular rule leads to as many cases being decided as possible in the way the judge prefers. We adopt the same definition of ideological alignment but recognize there are other types of preferences over rules that may exist, such as a preference for broad, narrow, vague, or specific rules.
3 We acknowledge that the legal fact and rule space may be more complicated than a unidimensional space (see, e.g., Lax 2007) . However, it is widely accepted that a single dimension is a reasonable approximation of judicial behavior (e.g., Martin and Quinn 2002) , and we expect that the existence of additional dimensions will only introduce noise, rather than bias, into our analyses.
4 Alternatively, one might directly model the relative weight of the disposition to the rule by weighting the payoff of the rule by (1 − φ), therefore as φ approaches 1, the disposition becomes relatively more important; as φ approaches 0, the rule becomes more important relative to the disposition. Where relevant in the description of the comparative statics, we footnote the effect that this weighting would have.
5 We focus on pure-strategy equilibria but conjecture that some mixed strategy equilibria may exist under knife-edge conditions. We identify in the appendix what we conjecture those mixed strategies to look like. See footnotes 21 and 22 for the necessary conditions for mixed strategy to exist.
6 It is important to note our model does not yield any predictions about which rule form the set will be selected as r a . Rather, all we predict is that the Lower Court will coordinate on a single r a from the set [r, r].
7 As noted in footnote 4, one might alternatively weight to rule by (1−φ). In that case, r = k−φ 1−φ , and r = k−(1−b)φ 1−φ . For k sufficiently small, e.g., k < 1 for r, the same comparative statics hold. Therefore, only if the costs of review are relatively large would this alternative specification lead to different expectations.
This occurs provided
12 Region V always occupies the space to the right of L; as L moves from 0 to the right and passes the relevant thresholds, Regions I-IV come into existence; the extremity of L is great enough for any region to exist under any circumstances does not affect equilibrium behavior in the regions that do exist.
13 Note that we have no expectations about the absolute level of review or reversal. In our theoretical model, the rate of review and reversal are conditional on, among other things, the distribution of the case facts. The data sets used in this study do not contain this information.
However, we can nevertheless derive predictions about how the rate of these events should change as a function of observable parameters.
14 We discard from our data all court of appeals cases not decided by three-judge panels.
15 To create the reversed variable, we reference the dis variable in the Spaeth database. We code our variable as 0 if dis=affirmed and 1 if dis=reversed or reversed and remanded. We code reversed as missing if dis is assigned any other value, as those values are more ambiguous in their substantive interpretation in the context of our model.
16
One concern often raised with using vote-based measures of judicial ideology is the potential endogeneity between the behavior studied and the predictive measure. Because all Supreme Court decisions in our model are sincere, it is appropriate to use measures of revealed preferences for the Supreme Court. By contrast, the Lower Court does not always behave sincerely, but the Judicial Common Space estimates of lower court preferences are not based on revealed behavior. Thus, while there is no perfect solution to the issue of measurement of judicial ideology, concerns about endogeneity that often arise in this setting are not implicated by our application.
17 For example, we have no easy way of measuring the value of the disposition or the location of the lower court rule.
18 Our results are robust the the exclusion of this predictor, but the predictor greatly improves the fit of the empirical model. To identify whether a dissenting opinion was written, we begin with the dissent variable in the Court of Appeals database and verify whether each panel was unanimous or not. We create a variable, dissent i , which equals 1 if there was a dissenting judge on case i and 0 otherwise. There was a dissenting opinion in 1287 (about 14%) of the cases.
19 Jewell (2004, 212-4) demonstrates that this representation of the likelihood model does not lead to biased estimates of the slope parameters but can lead to bias in the intercept parameters.
Because none of our hypotheses require inferences about the absolute level of review, this is an appropriate model for the inferences we seek to draw.
20
The estimates are statistically imprecise in the tails of the observed data.
21 This result excludes the possibility of a mixed strategy equilibrium. We conjecture that mixed strategy equilibria may exist for the knife-edge condition where r * = r.
22 As above, this result excludes the possibility of a mixed strategy equilibrium. We conjecture that mixed strategy equilibria may exist for the knife-edge conditions where r * = r l or where the Lower Court is indifferent between playing a risk-averse and a risk-seeking strategy. Note, for the latter knife-edge condition, this possibility introduces no new observable behavior, since the Lower Court would simply be mixing among already-identified equilibrium strategies. Table 1 : Estimates from empirical model. Estimates from maximizing log-likelihood given by equation (2); review parameters capture effect of covariates on the decision to review a case; reversal parameters capture effect of covariates on the decision to reverse a case once reviewed
